The Three-player Lowest Unique Number Game,
Economic Letters, accepted.

On the Efficiency of Queueing in Dynamic Matching Markets, (with Laura Doval),
Games and Economic Behavior, accepted.

Flexible Moral Hazard, (with George Georgiadis and Doron Ravid),
Econometrica, 2024(92), 397-409.

On the Coevolution of Cooperation and Social Institutions, (with Veronica Salazar).
European Economic Review, 2024(161), 1-9.
In memoriam Konrad Mierendorff

Smart Contracts and the Coase Conjecture, (with Alkis Georgiadis-Harris and Thomas Brzustowski).
American Economic Review, 2023(113), 1334-1359.

Optimal Technology Design, (with Daniel Garrett, George Georgiadis and Alex Smolin),
Journal of Economic Theory, 2023(209), 101-125.

Surplus Sharing in Cournot Competition, (with Daniele Condorelli).
Theoretical Economics, 2022(17), 955-975.

Learning Before Trading: On the inefficiency of Ignoring Free Information, (with Doron Ravid and Anne-Katrin Roesler).
Journal of Political Economy, 2022(130), 346-387.

Optimal Monitoring Design, (with George Georgiadis).
Econometrica, 2020(88), 2075-2107.

Information Design in the Hold-up Problem, (with Daniele Condorelli).
Journal of Political Economy, 2020(128), 681-709.

A Biological Foundation of Risk Preferences, (with Roberto Robatto).
Journal of Economic Theory, 2017(172), 410-422.

Buyer-optimal Learning and Monopoly Pricing, (with Anne-Katrin Roesler).
American Economic Review, 2017(107), 2072-2080.

Dynamic Contracting: An Irrelevance Result, (with Peter Eso).
Theoretical Economics, 2017(12), 109-139.

An Alternative to Signaling: Directed Search and Substitution, (with Matt Levy).
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2016(8), 1-15.

Contractible Contracts in Common Agency Problems,
Review of Economic Studies, 2015(82), 391-422.

A Biological Theory of Social Discounting, (with Arthur Robson).
American Economic Review, 2014(104), 3481-3497.

Spontaneous Discrimination, (with Marcin Peski).
American Economic Review, 2013(6), 2412-2436.

An Evolutionary Theory of Suicide, (with Caroline Thomas).
Games, 2013(4), 426-436.

On the Market for Venture Capital, (with Boyan Jovanovic).
Journal of Political Economy, 2013(121), 493-527.

The Evolutionary Basis of Time Preference: Intergenerational Transfers and Sex, (with Arthur Robson and Emil Iantchev).
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2012(4), 172-201.

Definable and Contractible Contracts, (with Michael Peters).
Econometrica, 2012(80), 363-411.

A Resurrection of the Condorcet Jury Theorem, (with Yukio Koriyama).
Theoretical Economics, 2009(4), 227-252.

Optimal Voting Scheme with Costly Information Acquisition, June 2009, (with Alex Gershkov).
Click here for an NAJ Economics review.
Journal of Economic Theory, 2009(144), 36-68.

Evolution of Time Preference by Natural Selection: Comment , (with Arthur Robson).
American Economic Review, 2008(98), 1178-1188.

The Price of Advice, (with Peter Eso).
RAND Jornal of Economics, 2007(38), 863-880.

Equilibrium Default Cycles, (with Natalia Kovrijnykh).
Journal of Political Economy, 2007(115), 403-446.

Optimal Information Disclosure in Auctions, (with Peter Eso).
Review of Economic Studies, 2007(74), 705-731.

Two-Object Two-Bidder Simultaneous Auctions,
International Game Theory Review, 2007(9), 483-493.

Can a Turing Player Identify Itself?, (with David Levine).
Economics Bulletin, 2006, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 1-6.

Equilibrium Transformation and the Revenue Equivalence Theorem,
Journal of Economic Theory, 2005(120), 175-205.

Compensation for Quality Difference in a Search Model of Money, (with Yuk-fai Fong).
International Economic Review, 2005(46), 957-971.

Beyond Chopsticks: Symmetric Equilibria in Majority Auction Games, (with Robert Rosenthal).
Games and Economic Behavior, 2003(45), 278-295.

Three-Object Two-Bidder Simultaneous Auctions: Chopsticks and Tetrahedra, (with Robert Rosenthal).
Games and Economic Behavior, 2003(44), 114-133.